

DISCIPLINA ELETIVA: THEORY OF REGULATION	CÓDIGO: GRDDIRELE0197
PROFESSOR: EDUARDO FERREIRA JORDÃO	CARGA HORÁRIA: 60h
<p>EMENTA</p> <p>Conceptualizing Regulation. The regulation rationales (why regulate?). Good Regulation and Better Regulation. Different ways to assess regulatory quality and proposals for an assessment system. Explaining regulation. Analysis of different theoretical approaches toward regulation. Consumer Choice, Interest Groups and Public Interest. Analysis of the institutional approaches and of the relation between institutional design and regulation. Identifying regulatory failure. Analysis of the regulatory strategies. Command and Control strategies and its problems. Cap-ture. Issues on legalism, standard-setting and enforcement. The pros and cons of incentive-based regimes. Market-harnessing controls. Competition Law and Negotiable Licenses as regu-latory strategies. Disclosure of information as a strategy and its limits and possibilities of applica-tion. New scopes for regulation: design solutions, choice architecture and nudging. Under-standing rules and standards as regulatory strategies and the optimal balance of normative in-determinacy. Analysis of enforcement alternatives. Diffuse regulatory governance: self-regulation, meta-regulation and regulatory experimentalism. Regulation and innovation.</p>	
<p>OBJETIVO GERAL</p> <p>Understand the variable meanings and different theoretical foundations of regulation, being able to criticize approaches, in articles and textbooks, that do not clearly set their regula-tion definition and fundamentals.</p>	
<p>OBJETIVO ESPECÍFICO</p> <p>Identify the main advantages and problems on each regulatory strategy studied. Properly design and criticize regulatory rules, standards, principles and proceedings as related to the regulatory goals and theoretical foundations.</p>	
<p>METODOLOGIA</p> <p>Classes will be mainly expositive and participative in a dialectical approach. When possible, the class will be divided in discussion groups to find solutions to particular regulatory problems, ori-ented by the professor.</p>	
<p>PROGRAMA</p> <p>PART 1: INTRODUCTION TO REGULATION</p> <p>Class 01: Introduction to the Course</p> <p>Class 02: Concepts of Regulation</p> <p>Class 03: Reasons to Regulate (Economic and non-economic reasons to regulate)</p> <p>Class 03: Reasons to Regulate (Economic and non-economic reasons to regulate)</p> <p>Class 05: Explaining Regulation (Public Interest and Public Choice)</p> <p>Class 06: Explaining Regulation 2 (Institutional, Network and Cultural Theories)</p> <p>Class 07: Regulatory Failure and Cost-Benefit Analysis</p> <p>Class 08: Revision of theoretical concepts and case studies</p> <p>PART 2: REGULATORY STRATEGIES</p> <p>Class 09: Strategies 1: Command and Control, Incentive-based Regimes and Market Harnessing</p> <p>Class 10: Strategies 2: Disclosure Regulation, Rights and Liabilities and Compensation Schemes</p> <p>Class 12: Strategies 3: <i>Nudging</i> and choice architecture</p>	

Class 12: Regulatory Alternatives: A Case
 Class 13: Designing Regulation that Works: Rules, Standards and Principles
 Class 14: Revision

---- EXAM PERIOD AND BREAK ----

PART 3: THE STRATEGIES IN ACTION

Class 15: When regulation doesn't work: unintended consequences and responsiveness issues

Class 16: Enforcement

Class 17: Responsive Regulation

PART 4: ISSUES ON REGIME DESIGN

Classes 18 and 19: Self-regulation, meta-regulation and experimentalism

Class 20: Transnational regulation and global governance

PART 5: REGULATING IN THE DARK

Class 21: Regulating Risks

Class 22: Regulation and Innovation

PART 6: REGULATING NETWORKS

Class 22: Public utilities regulation: an overview

Class 23: Regulating prices

Class 24: Can competition survive here? Unbundling and network neutrality

---- EXAM PERIOD ----

CRITÉRIOS DE AVALIAÇÃO

1 – Class participation, assignments and group activities (40%)

2 – Final paper (60%)

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